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Abstract
Craver claims that mechanistic explanation is ontic, while Bechtel
claims that it is epistemic. While this distinction between ontic and epis-
temic explanation originates with Salmon, the ideas have changed in the
modern debate on mechanistic explanation, where the frame of the de-
bate is changing. I will explore what Bechtel and Craver’s claims mean,
and argue that good mechanistic explanations must satisfy both ontic and
epistemic normative constraints on what is a good explanation. I will ar-
gue for ontic constraints by drawing on Craver’s work in section 2.1, and
argue for epistemic constraints by drawing on Bechtel’s work in section
2.2. Along the way, I will argue that Bechtel and Craver actually agree
with this claim. I argue that we should not take either kind of constraints
to be fundamental, in section 3, and close in section 4 by considering
what remains at stake in making a distinction between ontic and epis-
temic constraints on mechanistic explanation. I suggest that we should
not concentrate on either kind of constraint, to the neglect of the other,
arguing for the importance of seeing the relationship as one of integration.
Keywords: Ontic explanation, Epistemic explanation, Mechanistic explana-
tion, Bechtel, Craver.
1 The ontic-epistemic distinction for mechanis-
tic explanation
The original distinction between ontic and epistemic explanation is due to
Salmon and situated against the background of Hempel’s classic account of
explanation, and related views. So, for example, Salmon writes: ‘In its classic
form—the inferential version—the epistemic conception takes scientific expla-
nations to be arguments.’ He contrasts this with his own conception of explana-
tion: ‘The ontic conception sees explanations as exhibitions of the ways in which
what is to be explained fits into natural patterns or regularities ... [and] usually
takes the patterns and regularities to be causal.’ (Salmon, 1984, p293.) There
are more versions of the epistemic conception, and further nuances of Salmon’s
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views worthy of study, but my aim here is to examine the debate currently under
way in the mechanisms literature.
Carl Craver and William Bechtel have taken inspiration from Salmon’s dis-
tinction, and adopted its language, to disagree about the nature of mechanistic
explanation: Bechtel claims that mechanistic explanations are epistemic, while
Craver claims they are ontic. And this dispute is important to the mechanisms
literature widely, because most new mechanistas agree with Craver. As Wright
points out: ‘Perhaps because of their common interests in causality, most New
Mechanists have hitched their wagon to Wesley Salmon’s ontic conception of
scientific explanation’. (Wright, 2012, p376.) Certainly Machamer et al. (2000)
gives an ontic conception, Machamer (2004) seems to maintain it, and Glennan
(2002, 2005) explicitly agrees. So if any of Bechtel’s criticisms are right, that is
of wide importance to the mechanisms literature. Since only Bechtel and Craver
of the major mechanistas defend their view in any extended way, I will focus on
their work. Further, their work needs examination as what their specfic claims
are takes some work to understand, as they do not simply adopt a pre-existing
clear distinction.
I begin with Craver. There are two different things that Craver classifies as
ontic explanation, which may both derive from Salmon. First, Craver holds that
mechanistic explanation involves fitting a phenomenon into the causal structure
of the world: ‘I argue that good explanations in neuroscience show how phe-
nomena are situated within the causal structure of the world (Salmon 1984).’
(Craver, 2007, p21). Here, explanation involves showing or exhibiting something
about the causal structure of the world. Elsewhere, though, Craver says: ‘Other
times, the term explanation refers to an objective portion of the causal structure
of the world, to the set of factors that bring about or sustain a phenomenon
(call them objective explanations). ... Objective explanations are not texts;
they are full-bodied things. They are facts, not representations.’ (Craver, 2007,
p27.) Here, any reference to exhibition or showing is dropped. In this case the
mechanism itself explains.
Bechtel holds that explanation is deeply concerned with understanding, and
is essentially a human activity: ‘Explanation is fundamentally an epistemic ac-
tivity performed by scientists.’ (Bechtel, 2008, p18.) Given Bechtel’s concern
with understanding and the cognitive abilities of human beings in his overarch-
ing project of understanding mechanistic explanation, it is easy to assimiliate
his view to a psychologism where an explanation is anything that generates an
entirely subjective ‘aha’ feeling on the part of the receiver of the explanation.
This is a view that may well be rejected on the grounds that science is not in
the business of making people merely feel as though they have understood the
world. However, as Waskan (2011) argues, there is also a ‘success’ interpretation
of ‘understanding’, which requires success in understanding the real world. As
Bechtel firmly classifies his own view as epistemic, it seems likely that this is the
sense he intends, which is consistent with the idea that explanations generate
knowledge. So Bechtel seems to agree with his close collaborator: ‘It is surely
right to say that mechanistic explanatory texts aim to increase knowledge about
mechanisms.... Obviously, knowledge of how things work is an epistemic matter
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if anything is, which is just to say that analysis of mechanistic explanatory texts
properly requires a broadly epistemic conception of mechanistic explanation.’
(Wright, 2012, p382.) So, for Bechtel, and Wright, mechanistic explanations are
texts, or descriptions and so on, that aim to increase knowledge about mecha-
nisms. For the epistemic conception, the text or description explains. There are
further complexities of Bechtel’s real concern for the needs of actual cognizers
in mechanistic explanation, which I will return to later, applying Waskan’s ar-
guments in favour of some aspects of psychologism being of real use to epistemic
explanation.
Craver and Bechtel agree about a great deal regarding mechanisms and
mechanistic explanation, which is worth spelling out, to help pinpoint their
disagreement over ontic versus epistemic explanation. They have different ac-
counts of mechanisms, so in this paper I will follow the view I have argued for
elsewhere: ‘A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activities
organized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon.’ (Il-
lari and Williamson, 2012, p120.) In a very general way, finding mechanistic
explanations involves finding and describing the phenomenon, and finding and
describing the entities and activities, and their organization, by which the phe-
nomenon is produced. We argue that this account captures a core consensus on
what a mechanism is that the major mechanistas broadly agree on, while also
offering understanding of what does not count as a mechanism, so the debate
between Bechtel and Craver should not be affected by adopting this background
view.
With this background in mind, Craver’s ontic conception can be further
spelled out: the relevant domain of ontic explanation is the real world, which
has genuinely causal structure, some at least of which are entities and activities
organized to form mechanisms, and at least some of those mechanisms are mech-
anistic explanations—mechanisms explain the phenomena they are responsible
for.1 While Bechtel is cautious about making explicitly realist claims about the
causal structure of the world, he does not actually disagree with any of this
except the final claim. Neither Bechtel nor Craver is an instrumentalist about
science, so their disagreement is not a variation on the realist-instrumentalist
debate. Further, Bechtel and Craver, along with all the mechanistas, take the
thing explained to be a phenomenon, and do not seek answers to why-questions.
Bechtel does, however, deny that mechanisms themselves are ever mechanistic
explanations. Craver also seems to classify any exhibition of causal mechanisms
as an ontic explanation, while Bechtel might well classify such explanations as
epistemic. In such a case, though, Bechtel would still focus attention on the
description or exhibition itself in a way that Craver would not. In so far as
Craver still prioritises the mechanism itself in these cases, while Bechtel priori-
tises the description or exhibition, they still disagree. So I will take exhibitions
of mechanisms which prioritise the mechanism itself as ontic explanations, and
take such exhibitions which prioritise the description or exhibition as epistemic
explanations. I will return to this point later, particularly in section 3.
1I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a useful clarification along these lines.
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To motivate his view, Craver points out that we think that there are phe-
nomena that we know of, and we think they have an explanation, although we
don’t yet know it—indeed we may never know it. So undescribed mechanisms
can count as explainers (Craver, 2012, p7). He objects to explanations that
include non-ontic entities, such as diagrams and equations, presumably on the
grounds that equations and diagrams, as abstracta, cannot produce any worldly
phenomenon. This is a bone of contention with Bechtel, who increasingly thinks
that equations and other aspects of modelling mechanisms are essential to many
cases of what he now calls ‘dynamical mechanistic explanation’ (Bechtel, 2008).
In turn, one reason Bechtel offers in favour of his view is that a phenomenon
might remain when the mechanism that produced it has gone. This is not un-
common. For example a protein is produced from DNA, via mRNA, but the
mRNA is usually broken down immediately after use, while the protein remains.
Bechtel complains that a now-absent cause, such as my example of the mRNA,
cannot currently explain in the ontic sense (Bechtel, 2006, p34). Further, Bech-
tel says, mechanisms themselves, such as the protein synthesis mechanisms, were
around long before we had any scientific explanations.
Bechtel and Craver disagree, and their disagreement impacts on the whole
mechanisms literature. However, it is difficult to evaluate their dispute properly,
as it is difficult to identify their core motivations. Further, in many places the
arguments offered that do express their core motivations are question-begging—
at least in debate with each other. For example, Craver (2007) builds an account
of mechanistic explanation on criteria for good explanation that almost all look
causal. Bechtel repeats in many places that explanation is an essentially hu-
man activity. While these claims probably do reflect their core commitments,
Craver cannot build his view on the assumption that at least some explanations
are causes, which seems to be a claim that Bechtel denies; and Bechtel cannot
build his view on the assumption that all explanation essentially involves hu-
man cognitive activity, which seems to be a claim that Craver denies—at least,
they cannot depend on these assumptions when engaged in debate with each
other. Neither approach will move the debate forward, forcing a search for an
alternative approach.
Further complicating any attempt to move this debate forward is the fact
that the ontic-epistemic debate regarding mechanisms has changed from the
original ontic-epistemic debate in what is at stake, its motivation, and its
method, and it has not yet settled into a new frame. What is at stake has nar-
rowed, since there is so much agreement in the mechanisms literature over the
nature of mechanisms, as presented briefly above. Its motivation is now solely
to do with understanding mechanistic explanation, and lacks once-popular tar-
gets such as Hempel’s view of explanation. Finally, while some arguments are
still offered in the style of the classic debate—linguistic analysis of explanation
(Wright, 2012), or using cases of paradigm explanations to assess ascription con-
ditions for ‘explanation’ (Wright, 2012; Craver, 2012)—a new line of argument
is coming to prominence.
It will be a major part of the work of this paper to understand the new frame,
and urge that the debate regarding mechanisms should settle more firmly into
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that new frame, where consensus can be generated by pursuing the new line
of argument. Craver is explicit that he is arguing for normative constraints on
explanation: ‘The second goal is explanatory normativity. The theory should
illuminate the criteria that distinguish good explanations from bad.’ (Craver,
2012, p1.) So in this frame Craver is not arguing about what an explanation
itself is, but arguing for the importance of ontic constraints in recognising, find-
ing, and possibly even using good explanations. This is a different project, with
different things at stake. Argument over constraints concerns more the function
of good explanations in our essential scientific practices, and in designing those
practices to do better, rather than a backwards-looking argument concerning
common usage of the word ‘explanation’. Bechtel, and Bechtel and Wright, are
not so explicit, but they recognise and are concerned about such norms: ‘ex-
plaining refers to a ratiocinative practice governed by certain norms’ (Wright
and Bechtel, 2007, p51), although they also sometimes appear to be arguing
about what mechanistic explanations themselves are.2 It is true that neither
side consistently sticks to arguing over constraints, sometimes changing tack to
argue in a more traditional way over what explanations themselves are. How-
ever, they are moving towards a focus on constraints, away from the traditional
ontic-epistemic debate.
I will frame the debate in these terms of normative constraints on explana-
tion, so I will be concerned with standards that we hold scientific explanations
to, to make them good explanations, rather than norms or any other criteria to
make something an explanation at all. It might be thought that this is merely to
change the subject. On the contrary, this seems to me a positive move, towards
a more useful philosophical project, away from unhelpful polarising pressures.
Further, Craver holds that the ontic-epistemic debate has always been a norma-
tive debate, about regulative ideals for explanation (personal communication).
So I will not be primarily concerned with what explanations themselves are,
nor about fighting over whether paradigm cases of explanation can be captured
by each of the ontic or epistemic conceptions. I will comment further on this
during the paper, and particularly at the end of section 3.
Within this new frame, I will argue that good mechanistic explanations must
satisfy both ontic and epistemic constraints. I will argue for ontic constraints
by drawing on Craver’s work in section 2.1. I will argue for epistemic con-
straints by drawing on Bechtel’s work in section 2.2. Along the way, I will argue
that Bechtel and Craver actually agree on this. In brief, this is because while
Craver argues for ontic constraints, he does not offer arguments against epis-
temic constraints, and some of his work seems to commit him to accepting them
alongside ontic constraints. This argument is likely to generalise to the work of
other mechanistas such as Machamer and Glennan. In parallel, while Bechtel
argues for epistemic constraints, he does not argue against ontic constraints, and
2In the pre-publication manuscript, they write: ‘Mechanistic explanation is an epistemic
practice. There are norms governing such a practice—namely, that explaining a target phe-
nomenon requires an understanding of the systemic activities that locally produce it, which
in turn requires revealing the mechanism’s internal structure, function, and organization.’
(Wright and Bechtel, 2007, p.18) But this does not appear in the shorter published version.
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seems similarly committed to accepting them alongside epistemic constraints.
In section 3, I examine an additional argument of Craver’s, considering whether,
even if both kinds of constraints are admitted, an argument can be made that
one or the other is prior. I argue that such an argument cannot succeed without
making question-begging assumptions about the primary nature or purpose of
mechanistic explanation. The sensible conclusion is still to accept both kinds of
constraints. I close in section 4 by considering what remains at stake in making
a distinction between ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explana-
tion. I offer reasons against collapsing the distinction, instead arguing for seeing
the relationship as one of integration.
2 For both kinds of constraints
In this section, I will argue for two claims. First, we should accept both ontic and
epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation. Second, Bechtel and Craver
agree on this, as their work commits both of them to accepting both sets of
normative constraints. I will marshall arguments given by Bechtel and Wright,
and Craver, in support of my view. I use only some of their arguments here,
addressing further arguments of both in section 3.
2.1 For ontic constraints: Craver
I will begin with the first sense of ontic explanation, where the mechanism it-
self explains by being responsible—causally responsible—for the phenomenon.
Craver contends that this is a sense of explanation, specifically the sense in which
we say that some known phenomena have unknown explanations. Here, ‘expla-
nation’ is being used very much synonymously with ‘cause’: known phenomena
have unknown causes. It seems to me that defenders of the ontic conception
of explanation are free to retreat here, plant their flags, and forever refuse to
budge. There is no way for an opponent to gain leverage on the view, as if
Craver—and Machamer, Glennan and others—wish to use ‘explanation’ in that
sense, then however many times Bechtel, and Wright, deny that it is a real sense
of explanation, there is nothing to compel agreement.
Wright (2012) makes the best attempt to date to deny that this is a genuine
sense of explanation. He does not present it as such, but what he does is mount
an extended attack on the claim that ‘explanation’ is ambiguous that he iden-
tifies as the origin of Salmon’s arguments. This is an interesting approach, but
it does not succeed. First, Wright seems at various points to make question-
begging claims: ‘Biochemical pathways, changes in Ca 2+ concentrations, pha-
sic DA1 bursting or allostatic mesocorticolimbic dysfunction, oxygen generators,
etc. are simply inapposite candidates for doing any explaining’ (Wright, 2012,
p388), which might suggest that he finds no ambiguity by refusing to counte-
nance a purely ontic interpretation. Wright raises this concern himself and offers
a response: ‘This inference might be objected to on the grounds that ... [the ar-
guments only follow] if we decide in advance that explanation is not synonymous
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with cause or causal mechanism or the like; and yet, this decision is precisely
what is up for grabs. In response, this objection is also baseless. Explanation or
explain may be closely related in semantic space to a term like cause or causation
or mechanism, but they are neither synonymous nor substitutable salva veri-
tate.’ (Wright, 2012, p391.) However, a vaguer, more ambiguous term doesn’t
have to be synonymous or substitutable salva veritate with a more specific term
to have that more specific term as one legitimate interpretation. Second, and
more generally, unrelated to the specifics of Wright’s arguments, his approach
is hostage to what might be called definitional or usage stubbornness. If some
philosophers choose to use or define ‘explanation’ in such a way, particularly a
prominent group rather than a single individual, it is difficult to see how they
could be forced to desist!
This is one reason why the move away from arguing about what explanations
themselves are to considering normative constraints on explanations is an inter-
esting one, as it is a way to move the debate forward. In so far as Craver is inter-
ested in normative constraints on explanation, presumably he is not interested in
constraints on mechanisms—the mechanisms themselves simply are—he is pre-
sumably interested in how ontic features—features of mechanisms—constrain
explanatory descriptions of mechanisms. To offer reasons that may convince
ontic mechanistas to move their flags, or just leave them safely planted and go
and look elsewhere; there is already plenty of work on what causes are, and on
what mechanisms are, and so it is interesting to seek a distinctive task of an
account of mechanistic explanation.
So we move to Craver’s second sense of ontic mechanistic explanation, that
ontic explanations show or exhibit how the phenomenon fits in the causal struc-
ture of the world, by showing or exhibiting the mechanism responsible for the
phenomenon. As I have said, Craver still disagrees with Bechtel here as he
prioritises the ontic constraints over the exhibition. For Craver, explanation
cannot be solely to do with human representational processes, but must be
evaluated with respect to mechanisms. Craver writes: ‘The point of this section
is that ontic explanations, the causes and mechanisms in the world, make an es-
sential contribution to the criteria for evaluating explanatory communications,
texts (models), and representations. Good mechanistic explanatory models are
good in part because they correctly represent objective explanations.’ (Craver,
2012, p11.) So in Craver’s most recent work, his view is that ontic constraints
are normatively vital for evaluating mechanistic explanatory texts—identifying
good ones. That is what has come to be most important in his view. Note that
methods long-used in the debate over ontic-epistemic explanation such as lin-
guistic analysis or application criteria decided by looking at cases of paradigm
explanations are no longer of much interest. What is of interest is argument
based on the important function of ontic normative constraints in building ex-
planations.
Craver is right that this is an essential part of distinctively mechanistic ex-
planation, and he offers novel arguments for this view. He says that ontic con-
straints help us to make several important distinctions between different kinds
of explanations: ‘In Section 2, I illustrate how appeal to ontic explanations is
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essential for marking several crucial normative dimensions by which scientific ex-
planations are and ought to be evaluated: the distinction between how-possibly
and how-actually-enough explanations, the distinction between phenomenal de-
scriptions and explanations, the difference between predictive and explanatory
models, and the requirement that explanatory models should include all and
only information that is explanatorily relevant to the phenomenon one seeks
to explain.’ (Craver, 2012, p11.) It is certainly true that we distinguish how-
possibly explanations, which merely tell you how a phenomenon could be pro-
duced, from how-actually explanations, which tell us how a phenomenon is pro-
duced, by investigating whether how-actually explanations manage to describe
the actual worldly processes. One of the things that sets mechanistic expla-
nation apart from, for example, laws-based explanation, is the identification of
parts of the mechanism by which the phenomenon is produced. And, so that
this is not mere story-telling, rigorous empirical constraints on what we admit
as entities and activities and their organization is required.
Bechtel may emphasise the description of the mechanism, but he does not
deny these claims. In some ways, he is more extensively committed to them than
Craver is. Wright and Bechtel (2007) write: ‘Localization refers to mapping the
component operations onto component parts. Decomposition refers to taking
apart or disintegrating the mechanism into either component parts (structural
decomposition) or component operations (functional decomposition).’ (p62-3.)
Further, Bechtel and Richardson (2010) is an extended exploration and defence
of decomposition and localization as heuristics of mechanism discovery, where
it is clear that the point of integrating functional and structural decomposition
is to allow rigorous empirical constraints on the parts of mechanisms. Bech-
tel is perfectly clear that a mere functional decomposition is not a mechanistic
explanation. A functional decomposition merely identifies possible operations
(Craver’s activities). To get a mechanistic explanation requires mapping these
operations to working parts (Craver’s entities) to have a mechanistic explana-
tion. The mapping yields evidence that the explanation is no longer a how-
possibly story, that the correct entities and activities have been found: ‘One of
the strengths of decomposition and localization as a scientific strategy is that
it facilitates an increasingly realistic representation of the explanatory domain,
even when the initial representation is seriously distorted: failures of localiza-
tion can be as revealing as successes.’ (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p8.) For
Bechtel, of course, would say that we appeal to real-world mechanisms, not that
we appeal to ontic explanations, but this seems now to be disagreement merely
about a particular use of a word.
Perhaps due to this implicit commitment, Bechtel does not argue against
ontic constraints being relevant alongside epistemic constraints. Wright and
Bechtel (2007) write: ‘Do the component parts and their operations and or-
ganization figure in our understanding of how and why depolarization occurs?
Well, yes, in a flat-footed sense: without any of these things to implicate, mech-
anistic explanations would be without content.’ (p50.) They continue later: ‘In
the context of mechanistic explanation, the model’s elements correspond to the
parts of a mechanism, and their structure conforms, not to a theory, but rather
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to the mechanism’s constituency and interactivity.’ (p53.) Bechtel is interested
in mental models, but he is concerned with our knowledge of mechanisms, not
with mere mental models.
Craver is explicit about ontic constraints being causal constraints, while of
course Bechtel, and Wright and Bechtel, are not, writing only of the components
and organization of mechanisms. However, such parts and their organization
are clearly real existents, and so ontic, even if they do not count them as ontic
explanations. Further, it is clear that Craver counts reference to the components
and organization of mechanisms as fitting phenomena into the causal structure
of the world. There is little if any substantive disagreement.
So Craver’s positive argument for ontic constraints on mechanistic expla-
nation is absolutely right. But Bechtel’s extensive discussion of decomposition
and localization shows that he also recognises ontic constraints. He just doesn’t
want to call those constraints ontic explanations. Further, Craver doesn’t argue
directly against epistemic constraints as well as in favour of ontic constraints,
although I will return to two further arguments of his in section 3.
2.2 For epistemic constraints: Bechtel
Bechtel’s core idea is that mechanistic explanation essentially involves convey-
ing understanding of how the entities, activities and their organization produce
the phenomenon. Mechanistic explanation is a cooperative enterprise worked on
by many scientists, and so mechanistic explanation cannot ignore human repre-
sentational processes. A mechanism producing a phenomenon certainly causes
that phenomenon independently of us, but it is of no use to us whatsoever un-
til we grasp that mechanism, describe it, and understand it. As I have said,
both Bechtel and Wright use ‘understand’ on a success interpretation, where
understanding is not purely psychologistic but requires better knowledge of the
world, so that this is an epistemic conception. However, Bechtel and Wright
are also concerned with how actual cognizers manage to achieve such success:
‘After all, explaining refers to a ratiocinative practice governed by certain norms
that cognizers engage in to make the world more intelligible; the non-cognizant
world does not itself so engage.’ (Wright and Bechtel, 2007, p51.) As a re-
sult, Bechtel, along with Wright, is interested in exploring a space of reasons
vastly more complex than traditional approaches to characterizing explanation
in terms of inference or rational expectability, and particularly wishes to face up
to the increasing importance of complex mathematical modelling in mechanistic
explanation.
Craver is particularly suspicious of accepting equations, and other more com-
plex mathematical creations like models or simulations, as part of mechanistic
explanations. This is presumably because Craver cannot see where the ontic
counterpart of such creations are, that act as legimitate constraints on mecha-
nistic explanations. However, Bechtel is always interested in integrating equa-
tions, models and simulations with an account of genuinely mechanistic expla-
nation. So, for Bechtel, acknowledging the importance of mathematical entities
in mechanistic explanation goes beyond traditional deductive-nomological ex-
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planation, towards dynamical mechanistic explanation: ‘First, the equations are
advanced not as general laws, but as descriptions of the operations of specific
parts of a mechanism. Second, the purpose of a computational simulation (like
mental simulation in the basic mechanistic account) is not to derive the phe-
nomenon being explained but to determine whether the proposed mechanism
would exhibit the phenomenon. Finally, an important part of evaluating the
adequacy of a computational model is that the parts and operations it describes
are those that can be discovered through traditional techniques for decomposing
mechanisms.’ (Bechtel, 2011, p553.) Note that this last is clearly phrased as
a normative constraint. For Bechtel, the purpose of equations is to describe a
real mechanism, and so the mechanism is their ontic counterpart. Further, he
is trying to explain that he is not attempting to replace Hempel’s predictabil-
ity requirement by deriving the phenomenon using simulations. Instead, he
is trying to capture the way that simulations are used to find out whether
the ontic system could produce the phenomenon to be explained. This, then,
is a way of testing whether you have described the ontic system accurately,
and Bechtel will only accept parts and operations of a computational model
as describing a mechanism if those parts can also be discovered through more
traditional techniques. So Bechtel’s recent interest in the use of mathematical
creations is entirely consistent with his earlier focus on decomposition and lo-
calization. Mathematically complex strategies are just ways of describing—and
even discovering—more complex entities, activities, and forms of organization of
mechanisms than can be described or discovered without using maths. Bechtel
says this himself: ‘The need for simulation with mathematical models shows
how adequately recomposing the sorts of mechanisms commonly encountered
in biology and understanding their dynamics require tools beyond the qualita-
tive one contemplated in the basic mechanistic account. Accordingly, Bechtel
and Abrahamsen (2010) characterize such explanations as dynamic mechanistic
explanations.’ (Bechtel, 2011, p553-4.)
It is complexity of organization of real-world systems that demands such
mathematical techniques: ‘When the organization being investigated remains
relatively simple, it is possible to construct relatively simple explanatory mod-
els through mental simulation of the activity in the mechanism step by step.
As more organizational complexity and co-operations are discovered, however,
this becomes more difficult. With complex feedback loops, the mechanism can
begin to behave in unexpected ways. To understand such behavior, researchers
often need to oﬄoad some of the cognitive labor involved in constructing ex-
planatory models of parallel complexity onto their (research) environment—e.g.,
by supplementing their own ability to mentally trace activity in a system with
computer-based simulations. By supplying models of the various components
and the manner in which they interact with each other, researchers can discover
the consequences of organization.’ (Wright and Bechtel, 2007, p64-5.) In so
far as such techniques are aimed at uncovering real parts and complex forms
of organization of real mechanisms, in a form in which cognizers can use it to
come to have knowledge of these mechanisms, these concerns still fall within
the epistemic conception of explanation. It is true that Bechtel is concerned
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with the actual practices likely to generate successful understanding—successful
mechanistic knowledge—some of which are hostage to features of human psy-
chology. In this, he seems to agree with Waskan (2011), who argues that while
pure subjective psychologism about explanation is untenable, some psycholog-
ical features are of interest to our knowledge, in a way that goes beyond mere
descriptive accuracy. So, he thinks it is important to mechanistic knowledge
that we understand how possibly the phenomenon came about. This requires
some kind of mental grasp: ‘there is more to it than intelligibility than the
mere feeling that sometimes tracks it. While the feeling may be had without
explanation and vice versa, it is exceedingly difficult to find, or even imagine, a
case where one genuinely has an explanation for a happening and yet does not
understand how or why it might have occurred, and it is equally difficult to find
or imagine cases where someone genuinely understands how or why possibly and
yet lacks an explanation. ... The study of the psychological underpinnings for
intelligibility has, I believe, potential to tell us much about what explanations
are, ... and about the manner in which we evaluate them.’ (Waskan, 2011,
p.12.) If Waskan is right about this, then some psychological features are of
interest to the epistemic conception of explanation.
Craver initially seems to be very dismissive of similar concerns of Bechtel’s:
‘Such topics are the proper province of psychologistic theorizing about scientific
explanation. But that is a separate topic from the central topic of explana-
tion that has occupied philosophers for over 50 years.’ (Craver, 2012, p.22).
This is not obviously true. If, as Craver holds, the debate has always been
about normative constraints on explanation, then Bechtel’s view is that epis-
temic constraints are important normative constraints on explanation, and if
Waskan is right, then some psychological features are highly pertinent to such
epistemic constraints. But note that Craver’s worries about using equations in
explanations is partly due to his desire that the normative constraints on expla-
nation allow us to discriminate genuinely mechanistic explanation from other
forms of explanation: ‘The HH model might be included in the explanatory
text, but the equation is neither a cause nor a constituent of action potentials.
This mistake is committed by those who think of the HH model as a law that
governs the action potential ... rather than as a mathematical generalization
that describes how some of the components in the action potential mechanism
behave ...’ (Craver, 2012, p5). Craver’s objection is not to using maths per se,
and I have already explained above that Bechtel is interested in equations and
simulations that help you describe—and possibly even discover—working parts
of real mechanisms.
Considered more closely, what Craver is really rejecting is an exclusive focus
on psychologistic theorizing, on those aspects of our representations of mecha-
nisms that are subject to the needs of us as knowers, to the detriment of under-
standing that mechanistic explanations must also satisfy ontic constraints. For
Craver, the activity of describing, simulating and otherwise representing mecha-
nisms is important to science, and he shows this when he is actually working with
mechanisms. He recognizes that epistemic aspects of mechanistic explanation—
including diagrams—are vital to the success of scientific practice: ‘Discovering
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a mechanism involves specifying and filling in the details of a schema, that is,
instantiating it by moving to a lower degree of abstraction. As we will see,
diagrams and equations are often employed to depict graphically the schematic
organization of mechanisms.’ (Darden and Craver, 2002, p4.) Later, we get:
‘Crick (1959) generated a set of alternative hypotheses to resolve this anomaly,
localized in various stages of the mechanism schema.’ (Darden and Craver, 2002,
p14.) The same idea of a large community of scientists communicating and act-
ing on a common representation of a mechanism is also implicit throughough the
argument for the mosaic unity of neuroscience in Craver (2007). While Craver
emphasizes the ontic constraints, he employs epistemic constraints. He is not
at all inclined to argue that we should never pay attention to epistemic and
even to ‘psychologistic’ aspects of explanatory practices. (Craver, 2012, p1) is
quite explicit: ‘I do not claim that one can satisfy all of the normative crite-
ria on explanatory models, texts, or communicative acts by focusing on ontic
explanations alone. Clearly there are questions about how one ought to draw
diagrams, organize lectures, and build elegant and useable models that cannot
be answered by appeal to the ontic structures themselves.’
Craver has a final concern worth mentioning: ‘There is one further reason
to avoid equating scientific explanation with the abilities of individual cognitive
agents. Some phenomena might be so complex that they overwhelm our lim-
ited cognitive systems.’ (Craver, 2012, p16-7.) This is right, but it is not an
individual cognitive agent that Bechtel or Wright have in mind, but exactly the
kind of collaborative scientific work that Craver rcognizes.
So Bechtel’s positive argument for epistemic constraints on mechanistic ex-
planation is right. However, Craver’s work shows that he also recognises such
constraints. Further, Bechtel doesn’t argue against ontic constraints being rele-
vant to mechanistic explanation alongside epistemic ones. Indeed, I have already
argued that Bechtel’s work on decomposition and localization shows a deep ap-
preciation of the ontic constraints that belong distinctively to mechanistic ex-
planation. To summarise, I have now shown that we need to recognize both
ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation, and that the work
of both Craver and Bechtel shows commitment to both kinds of constraints.
With this in view, we can return briefly to their concerns described in section
1, and see that they vanish. Bechtel’s concern was that now-absent mechanisms
cannot explain in the ontic sense, and that mechanisms have been around for
much longer than we have had mechanistic explanations. But with the shift
to focus on constraints, and the admission of epistemic constraints, we have
satisfied that. If we admit both kinds of constraints, then until we describe
mechanisms, we may have causes, but we have no interesting explanations. And
we can describe currently absent mechanisms. Particularly in the general case,
we can describe how mRNA usually operates, whether or not it is currently
so operating. Craver should also now have no problem admitting non-ontic
entities like diagrams and equations, so long as they are not involved in mere
phenomenal or how-possibly explanations, but are used to describe, and to allow
us to manipulate ideas about, worldly entities, activities, and their organization.
So as Bechtel and Craver’s concerns are expressed in their earlier work, those
12
concerns have now been answered. However, a more sophisticated argument is
explicit in Craver (2012), and a correlative argument may be detected as implicit
in Bechtel and Wright’s work. I will examine these now.
3 Are either ontic or epistemic constraints more
fundamental?
To recall briefly, the frame of the ontic-epistemic debate has changed in the
mechanisms literature. There is a background of agreement about what mecha-
nisms are, and the process of finding mechanisms, so that the area of dispute is
narrow. I have also indicated the importance of the shift of focus to normative
constraints: ways of evaluating good explanations. In this frame, I have ar-
gued that we should accept both ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic
explanations.
The further argument of Craver’s weaving through those I have already
described is for the conclusion that ontic constraints are more fundamental than
epistemic constraints. I will examine his argument in this section, and argue that
we can provide a parallel argument for the importance of epistemic constraints—
an argument that may be implicit in Wright and Bechtel’s paper. To summarise,
this is because Craver’s argument requires an assumption about the primary
aim of explanation, while a parallel argument for epistemic constraints merely
requires a different assumption about the primary aim of explanation. I will
argue that we should accept both aims, as Bechtel and Craver both do. However,
if we hold neither aim to be primary, we will accept both ontic and epistemic
constraints as essential for successful mechanistic explanation, but hold neither
to be fundamental.
I have argued extensively that Craver admits epistemic constraints on ex-
planatory texts. But he also writes of an: ‘asymmetric direction of fit between
the representation-involving ways of talking about explanation and the ontic
perspective.’ (Craver, 2012, p7.) Presumably he means to imply that there is
no perspective from which representation-involving ways have some kind of pri-
ority. He writes: ‘The ontic structure of the world thus makes an ineliminable
contribution to our thinking about the goodness and badness of explanations.’
(Craver, 2012, p11.) Presumably, again, he means to claim that ontic con-
straints are ineliminable in a way in which epistemic constraints are not. So
ontic constraints are asymmetrically prior or fundamental or ineliminable, and
epistemic constraints aren’t. This claim reintroduces genuine disagreement be-
tween Craver and Bechtel, as while I have argued that Bechtel should allow
ontic constraints, he will certainly not allow them priority.
A similar idea seems to be present in Wright and Bechtel’s paper. Consider
again part of a quote given earlier: ‘what our understanding literally proceeds
‘through’ is a network of linguistically- or graphically-expressed operations on
representations.’ (Wright and Bechtel, 2007, p50.) In the phrase ‘literally pro-
ceeds through’, it is not hard to see the implicit idea that epistemic items are
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more important to explanation than ontic constraints.
The problem is, the only way to get priority for one or the other set of
constraints seems to be to grant some kind of priority to the need that that set
of constraints meets. We might grant priority to the need that our scientific
explanations reflect the nature of reality. Certainly, if we grant priority to
this aim, then the ontic constraints will inherit that priority over epistemic
constraints. But clearly Bechtel will not admit priority to any such aim, so
this assumption cannot be introduced into an argument with Bechtel without
begging the question. In the second place, Bechtel could construct an entirely
parallel argument in favour of the priority of epistemic constraints, so long as he
is allowed to make his favourite assumption. Bechtel seems to believe that, while
satisfying ontic constraints is important to mechanistic explanation, the most
important aim of mechanistic explanation is the building of an understandable,
mentally manipulable, communicable, cognitive model. If such an assumption
is admitted, then epistemic constraints will be prior.
Two exactly parallel arguments can be run. I run them here side by side in
order to show that neither can succeed without begging the question about the
other. In favour of the priority of ontic constraints, Craver writes: ‘The point
of these examples is that models may lead one to expect a phenomenon with-
out thereby explaining the phenomenon. These judgments of scientific common
sense seem to turn on the hidden premise that explanations correctly identify
features of the causal structures that produce, underlie, or otherwise responsible
for the explanandum phenomenon (see Salmon 1984). Expectation alone does
not suffice for explanation.’ (Craver, 2012, p10.) In parallel, Bechtel, or Wright,
could say: ‘one can identify features of the causal structures that produce, un-
derlie, or are otherwise responsible for the explanandum phenomenon without
thereby explaining the phenomenon. This judgement of scientific common sense
seems to turn on the hidden premise that explanations convey some kind of un-
derstanding, so that they allow scientists to mentally model the phenomenon—
perhaps to expect it. Identifying causal structure alone does not suffice for
explanation.’
Again, Craver writes: ‘The methods that scientists use to discover how the
world works, the standards to which they hold such tests, are intimately con-
nected with the goal of science to reveal the causal structures that explain why
the phenomena of the world occur and why they occur as they do. One can-
not carve off the practice of building explanations from these other endeavors.’
(Craver, 2012, p11.) But Bechtel, or Wright, could say: ‘The methods that
scientists use to model the world, to understand it mentally and communicate
it, are intimately connected with the goal of science to achieve understanding, a
communicable understanding, that is crucial to the forward-progress of science.
One cannot carve off the practice of building explanations from this need for
understanding.’
I think that Craver is exactly right in what he says. What is unnecessary
is merely the extra claim that ontic constraints are fundamental. The parallel
arguments that I have constructed are also right, but similarly not entitled to
the conclusion that epistemic constraints have some kind of priority. It seems
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that the most sensible conclusion to draw is that neither aim of mechanistic
explanation is prior to the other. Ontic and epistemic constraints are both
ineliminable, as both aims must be met, to generate a successful mechanistic
explanation:
• Describe the (causal) structure of the world: to be distinctively mecha-
nistic, describe the entities and activities and the organization by which
they produce the phenomenon or phenomena.
• Build a model of the activities, entities and their organization that scien-
tists can understand, model, manipulate3 and communicate, so that it is
suitable for the ongoing process of knowledge-gathering in the sciences.
If this is right, then both epistemic and ontic constraints are essential for
mechanistic explanation, but neither is prior. Without the first constraint, we
are not explaining the production of a phenomenon by a mechanism; without the
second we do not achieve the understanding essential to explanation. Bechtel
and Craver should both be prepared to accept this: Bechtel doesn’t want to
claim that what is really in the world doesn’t matter; while Craver doesn’t
want to claim that our ability to understand explanations doesn’t matter.
I will close this section by pausing to reconsider two different ways of constru-
ing the ontic-epistemic debate, from its origins, and addressing a final argument
of Craver’s. Craver and Bechtel agree on the vast majority of their claims about
mechanisms, and on the experimental work used to discover them, so they are
much closer together than those in the original debate. We are also now in a
position to appreciate fully how the shift to consideration of normative con-
straints on explanations both reflects the current context of agreement, and
enables further consensus.
The original ontic-epistemic debate might be interpreted as more concerned
with what explanations themselves are, as it were, metaphysically. This con-
ception of the issue seems to have gone along with a tendency for making a
binary choice: either explanations are portions of the mind-independent world,
or they are some kind of representational stuff. Wright (2012) detects a similar
polarisation in the original debate, but suggests that it derives from Salmon’s
ambiguity claim: ‘The general idea is that we can speak of different senses of
explanation, which in turn licenses a bifurcation of scientific explanations into
two kinds: those that reside in the mind-independent world versus those that re-
side in the world-dependent mind.’ (Wright, 2012, p.381.) Whatever the source
of polarisation in the traditional debate, it is clear that normative constraints
allow consensus, as admitting one set of constraints is no bar to accepting an-
other set. Once the new frame of the debate is fully embraced, admitting both
sets of constraints is the sensible option. This shift to arguing about normative
constraints is a helpful step forward, as it encourages a consensus position that
can satisfy significant thoughts polarising the original debate. One natural rea-
son to claim that explanations are ontic things is the thought that explanations
3This does not require manipulation in Woodward’s sense.
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cannot ignore worldly things. One natural reason to claim that explanations
are epistemic things is the thought that explanations must meet our epistemic
needs. But both of these thoughts are met by admitting both sets of normative
constraints, with further debate about the metaphysical nature of explanations
rendered unnecessary. As Craver is now explicit in accepting the move to consid-
ering normative constraints on good explanation, I think he is bound to accept
that some of the regulative ideals governing what makes a good mechanistic
explanation include representational aspects.
It is in this context that I wish to reconsider a third argument of Craver’s
that I touched on in section 1. In more detail, he says that there are ‘sentences’
that we need ontic explanation to make sense of:
(A) Our world contains undiscovered phenomena that have expla-
nations.
(B) There are known phenomena that we cannot currently explain
... but that nonetheless have explanations.
(C) A goal of science is to discover the explanations for diverse phe-
nomena.
(D) Some phenomena in our world are so complex that we will
never understand them or model them, but they have explanations
nonetheless. (Craver, 2012, p7.)
Such sentences do give us some reason to think that there could be a purely
ontic sense of explanation, where ‘explanation’ is interpreted as meaning little
if anything more than ‘cause’. For Wright (2012), this is a mistaken, loose use
of ‘explanation’. I argued in section 2.1 that no-one can be rationally compelled
to give up such an interpretation. However, I hope that the need to insist on
that pure sense has now been severely undermined by the argument that the
core concern of advocates of the ontic conception such as Craver can be met by
considering ontic constraints on exhibitions of worldly mechanisms. If, instead,
fruitless disagreement over the use of words can be avoided, and consensus on
substantive issues reached, this is a good reason for flexibility.
Finally, if one is still seeking a remaining difference between Bechtel and
Craver, it is that Bechtel is cautious about making straightforwardly realist
claims, generally seeking to avoid anything that verges on metaphysics. Bechtel
is not anti-realist; he is just more cautious than Craver. However, this difference
is not deep, given the extent of the agreement over the nature of mechanisms I
presented in 1. Both know very well that in our epistemic practices we might not
know whether we have before us a how-actually or a how-possibly model, and
both agree about the kinds of experimental work done to try to decide between
the two options. I think this closes the final path for regenerating disagreement,
but the large body of consensus has survived.
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4 For integration
If I have been persuasive about a view that Craver and Bechtel can both accept,
it is natural to wonder what remains at stake in the ontic-epistemic distinction.
I have criticised Craver for over-concentration on ontic constraints, and Bechtel
for over-concentration on epistemic constraints, but does this really matter?
This is worth pause for thought, as it reveals why it is important to recognise
both sets of constraints.
On the epistemic side, it is not difficult to make up stories about the world
that nevertheless enhance understanding and even knowledge of the world. Con-
sider Plato’s image in the Phaedrus of the soul or psyche as a chariot with one
black horse and one white, that conveys the idea of the psyche in conflict as
the two horses try to pull in opposite directions. Plato uses this to illuminate
what he takes to be a serious problem: explaining how one person can be in
internal conflict. The explanation is strictly false, of course, but illuminating
about a real phenomenon. For a more mundane example, consider explaining to
a small child that mummy is getting fat because there is a baby in her tummy.4
Mummy is not getting fat, and the baby is not in her stomach. This explana-
tion is strictly false, but still illuminating, and, as it is expressed in the only
concepts the child understands, may be an ineliminable step on the road to full
knowledge. On the ontic side, it is also not difficult to say something about the
causal structure of the world, or even to say something about the right portion
of the world for a particular phenomenon. When an explanation is sought, a
scientist in a lab might point or wave at something and say we think it’s that
thing, there, that’s doing it. Such pointing conveys something to the original
enquirer, or indeed to the wider scientific field, but little of detailed usefulness.
It is probably in this kind of way that most of the population knows that their
hair and eye colour has something to do with their genes, in their cells.
Each kind of constraint alone gives us some kind of useful set of norms for
evaluating, and attempting to build, mechanistic explanations. However, it is
important to recognise both sets of constraints precisely because that turns
our attention very quickly to the relationship between ontic and epistemic con-
straints. The real achievement of mechanistic (and possibly other forms of) ex-
planation is satisfying both ontic and epistemic constraints simultaneously, to
get a story constrained by all the empirical contact with the world that ingenuity
can design; a story that we can understand, manipulate and communicate, that
we can use, and use collaboratively, to help us manipulate, control and predict
the world—and lead science to better knowledge. This is the ongoing challenge
of mechanism discovery. Missing this is what is damaging about Craver’s over-
concentration on ontic constraints, and Bechtel’s over-concentration on epis-
temic constraints.
There is a further interesting question concerning the relationship between
these two kinds of constraints. It arises when we ask what aspects of our mech-
anistic explanations we should take to tell us about what is in the world, and
4Thanks to Julia Tanney for originally suggesting to me this endlessly useful example.
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what aspects tell us more about human psychology and scientific convention
than about the world. A natural first pass is the aspects satisfying ontic con-
straints tell us about the world, the aspects satisfying epistemic constraints only
about our own knowledge-building practices.
But the story is more complex than that. There are different kinds of epis-
temic constraints.5 One set is entirely determined by the kind of successful
communication necessary for the knowledge-building of the scientific commu-
nity, and it is particularly unconnected from the mechanism described. For
example, if it is easier for scientists (and students) to understand diagrams of
protein synthesis if we use different colours for the background cell parts, and
the different active parts, such as DNA, mRNA, and ribosomes, that is quite
independent of the worldly parts described in such diagrams. As another ex-
ample, explanations tailored to the needs of a particular audience, such as the
small child above, will take on aspects that are not a part of our more general
scientific explanations. Note that these kinds of epistemic aspects of these kinds
of mechanistic explanations are not in serious danger of being mistakenly inter-
preted as reflecting the world. I have suggested that Waskan is right to think
that these considerations are legitimately part of the concern of the epistemic
conception of explanation.
The second set of epistemic constraints is more connected to the world. We
abstract, selecting only some stuff in the world to describe, seeking to ma-
nipulate and communicate only information about some stuff and not about
others. We seek explanations that are as general, unified, and as simple as
possible. This is vital to the forward-looking aspect of scientific explanation,
the forward-drive to better explanations. This fact does, quite rightly, advise
caution, as we should expect some such features of our explanations to reflect
our epistemic limitations and preferences, at times perhaps even more strongly
than they reflect the world. This is just to recast the familiar point that unity,
simplicity, and possibly many other things are vital constraints on scientific the-
orizing, but they do not necessarily indicate unity and simplicity in the world.
In the language of this paper, they are epistemic constraints, and so subject to
reflecting accidents of human psychology.
What is crucial is that we will often not be in a position to know whether
a particular aspect of a particular mechanistic explanation is there to satisfy
epistemic constraints alone, or ontic, or both. And this is another reason why
it is important to recognise both sets of constraints. It would be simpler if we
could entirely separate ontic and epistemic constraints, in our practices, or in
our theories, so that we can know cleanly what is in the world, and what is an
aspect of our theorising. This is not as damaging as might be thought. The
human brain, which generates the psychological needs that epistemic constraints
must meet, is itself a worldly entity, existing in the world through time, affected
by its engagement with the world—particularly with the empirical engagement
with the world that is the process of building mechanistic explanations.
This means that what looks to us intelligible, simple and unified is not a
5I thank Michael Strevens for pressing me on this point.
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static feature of human psychology, but is affected by our empirical engage-
ment. Newtonian action at a distance used to seem quite impossible to us; so
did quantum mechanical indeterminism, and non-locality. Physicists sincerely
describe quantum mechanical equations as elegant, a claim that can generate
hilarity in those unused to working with such theories. If empirical engagement
continually forms what we find intelligible, simple and unified, then epistemic
constraints on explanation, even the more ‘psychologistic’ constraints, are deeply
entangled with ontic ones. There may always be some aspects of our theories
for which there is no fact of the matter, at a particular moment in time, whether
they reflect ontic or epistemic constraints. And any successful disentangling will
need to look at what is happening over time, rather than at a single time.
I will finish as I began, with Salmon, as in some modes this seems to me
an insight of Salmon’s. He writes: ‘What constitutes an adequate explanation
depends crucially, I think, on the kind of world in which we live; moreover, what
constitutes an adequate explanation may differ from one domain to another in
the actual world.’ (Salmon, 1984, p299.) Salmon does not make change over
time explicit, but I have argued that this claim amounts to more than the claim
that explanations must meet ontic constraints as well as epistemic. The point
is that the very process of science affects what epistemic constraints we need
to satisfy. It affects them so deeply that it is not always clear whether some
constraints are epistemic or ontic. In the end, this means it is best to understand
that our good mechanistic explanations are always the result of a struggle to
satisfy both ontic and epistemic constraints.
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